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Abstract “Investment in energy efficiency: do the
characteristics of firms matter?” In their famous 1998
paper, DeCanio and Watkins raised the question and
answered it affirmatively. Our paper addresses a par-
allel question: “Investment in energy efficiency: do the
characteristics of investments matter?” To answer this
question, we first describe our new investment
decision-making model, applicable to all investment
types. We then discuss our research results, based on
questionnaires submitted to finance managers of 35
major electricity consumers in various commercial and
industrial sectors. We show how characteristics other
than profitability play an important role in investment
choices. The investment category influences profit-
ability evaluation, profitability requirement, and, ulti-
mately, the decision made. For half of the firms in our
study, energy-efficiency investments did not exist as a
category. However, wide diversity regarding invest-
ment behavior is observed between firms. Our find-
ings lead to a different explanation of the energy-
efficiency gap and open the way for a new approach
to promoting energy-efficiency investments, which is
briefly discussed in the conclusion.
Keywords Corporate finance . Capital budgeting .
Investment decision-making . Strategic decision-
making . Organization behavior . Energy-efficiency
investments . Energy-efficiency gap
Introduction
According to mainstream neoclassical economics, in-
vestment decisions are strictly based on investment
profitability, and firms should undertake all investments
with a positive net present value.1 Energy-efficiency
investments are not decided upon by profit-seeking
firms because of their low real profitability (among
others, Anderson and Newell 2004; Golove and Eto
1996; Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sutherland 1991; Van
Soest and Bulte 2001) or because information problems
prevent price indications from reaching decision makers
(Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sorrell, et al. 2000) or force
organizations to define sub-optimal routines (DeCanio
1993; Quirion 2004; Ross 1986).
According to the economic perspective on market
barriers to energy-efficiency investments, information
asymmetry, an organizational failure, is partially re-
sponsible for underinvestment in energy efficiency. In
organizations, middle management is closer to opera-
tions and is therefore better informed than upper man-
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1 Where net present value is calculated with a hurdle rate higher
than the cost of capital for a company.
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agement. Yet, middle management decisions are bi-
ased by bounded rationality and opportunism. This
situation is known as moral hazard, a form of infor-
mation asymmetry theorized by the agency theory. To
reduce the potentially negative consequences of such a
situation for their organization, upper management
fixes a priori rules, or routines (DeCanio 1993; Stern
and Aronson 1984), which frame and control decision-
making. These routines can strongly influence organ-
izations’ investment decisions. For instance, Sorrell et
al. ((2000): 46) consider that “most decisions are a
result of applying a set of rules to a situation, rather
than a systematic analysis of alternatives.” Pay-back
or hurdle-rate requirements for investment are examples
of such routines, as described by DeCanio: “hurdle rates
can be set with an eye towards the problems of control
of a large organization, not just to correspond to the
firm’s cost of capital” (DeCanio 1993: 908). DeCanio
mentions a survey conducted by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) which showed that “the me-
dian pay-back required for one class of energy invest-
ment was 2 years. A payback of 2 years for a project
with a 10-year lifetime is equivalent to a post-tax real
rate of return of 56 %” (DeCanio, idem). The same
reasons may explain the frequent procedure of capital
rationing by firms, as described by Ross (1986). Impor-
tance of routines, especially budgetary routines, in in-
vestment decision-making is also underlined by Quirion
(2004). These routines translate into sub-optimal invest-
ment decisions, i.e., those where investments with prof-
itability higher than the cost of capital for a company are
not being decided upon, in contradiction with the pre-
scriptions of the conventional theory of investment.
In real life, firms do not make their investment deci-
sions based on the conventional neoclassical theory of
investment. Decision-making research depicts a complex
reality of general2 investment decision making. Energy
economics research has shown that factors other than
profitability—factors which are not related to market or
organization failures—do interfere in energy-efficiency
investment decisions. In their 1998 paper, DeCanio and
Watkins studied decisions by firms to join the EPA’s
program Green Lights. Decision to join Green Lights
may be thought of as a signal of a firm’s willingness to
undertake a program of investments in lighting efficien-
cy. According to the conventional theory of investment,
characteristics of the firms that join should not influence
their decision to join Green Lights and to commit to
energy efficiency investments. On the contrary, results
of DeCanio and Watkins’ empirical study show that the
characteristics of firms—such as size, financial perfor-
mance, sector, or geographical location—“do influence
the probability of a company’s joining the Green Lights
program” (DeCanio and Watkins 1998: 103).
In contradiction with conventional theory, invest-
ment strategic character, or nature, also influence invest-
ment decisions. This is the stance of our paper. Based on
the Dutton et al. (1989) conceptual framework, charac-
teristics of an investment decision can be classified into
two categories: analytic characteristics and content char-
acteristics. Analytic and content characteristics deter-
mine investment strategic character. Decision-making
research has studied the influence of analytic character-
istics on decision making, but the ways in which content
characteristics influence investment decisions has gen-
erally been neglected. However, as shown by the small
amount of existing research, investment content does
matter in investment decision making.
By linking the fields of strategy and finance, we
have built a methodological tool, based on content
characteristics, to better understand an investment stra-
tegic nature—or strategicity—and to measure it.
Based on this theoretical framework, we conducted
an empirical survey in Geneva, Switzerland, from
2006 to 2007. Survey results show the influence of
strategic considerations on general investment deci-
sion making and the often mediocre strategic impor-
tance of energy-efficiency investments for businesses.
The goal of this paper is to describe our findings
and their implications for researchers, practitioners,
and policy makers.
To address this goal, the paper is organized into three
parts. The first part describes our theoretical framework;
the second part describes our research methodology, and
the third part discusses the results of the research, which
can be classified into two themes: general corporate
investment behavior and energy-efficiency investment
behavior. The conclusion will briefly discuss the impli-
cations of our findings in the field of energy efficiency.
Investment decision making
The theoretical framework described in this part is
divided in two sections. The first section summarizes
2 “General” here meaning not especially aimed at energy
conservation.
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our model of investment decision making, a model
useful to understanding, or even influencing, any type
of investment decision (Fig. 1). The second section
focuses on analyzing and defining the strategic nature
of an investment.
A new model of investment decision making
Analyzing the large amount of research in the fields of
decision making and organizational finance leads one
to define investment decision making as a complex
process, one which is influenced by many factors.
Rooted in an extensive exploration of the literature,
our model of investment decision making explains
which factors play a role and why and how they
influence investment decision making. We have drawn
the following diagram to represent this model.
According to the model, and as shown in the diagram
above, investment decision making must be considered,
from a dynamic perspective, not as a point in time but as
the result of a decision-making process. This process is
influenced by (1) organizational and external contexts
along any number of points that surround it, (2) actors
involved, and (3) characteristics of the investment and
of the investment decision to be made. Among invest-
ment characteristics, strategic character is a key factor
influencing decision making. But strategic character is
not given; it is interpreted by actors3 and by organiza-
tions, due to the action of several filters. These elements
influencing investment decisionmaking are described in
more detail in the following pages.
Decision-making: not a point in time but a process A
decision is a step in a decision-making process, defined
as a dynamic chain of actions and events. When it can
be identified,4 a decision cannot be considered as a
single element or as a point in time.5 The decision-
making process comprises three phases: identification
(diagnosis), development (build-up of solutions), and
selection (evaluation of the different solutions and
choices). At the very beginning of the decision-
making process, the diagnostic phase is crucial in two
ways: Firstly, it translates—or not—an initial idea
(Desreumaux and Romelaer 2001) into a decision
event; secondly, it influences the subsequent phases of
development and choice. For the sake of clarity, the
preceding diagram represents the decision-making pro-
cess as smooth and linear, which is rarely the case: In
the real world, the decision-making process is generally
cyclical and uneven, with feedback loops, pauses, and
dead ends. It is only linear and sequential in the case of
highly structured decisions, based on ready-made sol-
utions (Desreumaux and Romelaer 2001).
Decision-making: a process influenced by organiza-
tional and external contexts Organizational context
and external context influence all of the decision-
making process phases. Organizational context com-
prises structure, strategy, and culture; the external
context is referring to the organization’s environment.
Main external context components are competition
moves, demand, social evolutions, regulation, the gen-
eral economy, and technological progress. However,
an organization’s environment is not given; rather, it is
interpreted and “built” by actors’ vision and by orga-
nizational filters (corporate culture, routines, control
systems). As described by Lyles ((1987), p 266), with
reference to Weick (1979), “organizations will invent
the environment to which they will respond by decid-
ing which aspects of the environment are important or
unimportant.”
3 In the field of organization behavior, “actors” mean individu-
als and groups.
4 It is not always possible to trace decisions retroactively. “If a
decision is like a wave breaking over the shore—that is, perhaps
identifiable at some sort of climax—then tracing a decision process
back into an organization becomes much like tracing the origin of a
wave back into the ocean.” (Langley et al. 1995: 264).
5 “Instead of a decision appearing at a point in time, decision-
making follows a general trajectory of gradual convergence on the
image of some final action. Instead of conceiving decision making
as a series of steps (or cycling imposed on a linear sequence…), it
comes to be seen in a more integrative way as the construction of an
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Fig. 1 A new model of investment decision making
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Decision making: a process influenced by actors’
power The actors involved influence the course of
the decision-making process and its result, which can
be a negative, positive, or no-decision. Decision making
is political because organizations are political systems,
i.e., they are collectives of people with competing inter-
ests. In any organization, a dominant coalition (Prahalad
and Bettis 1986), or a “key collection of individuals”
composing top management, has a significant influence
on the way a firm is managed. According to Miller et al.
(1996), the dominant coalition is a “core triad of heavy-
weight functions”: production (or its equivalent in serv-
ices companies), marketing and sales, and finance.
Heavyweight functions are closely associated with core
business. Together with general management, this coa-
lition imposes its choices upon the organization be-
cause, “simply put, decisions follow the desires and
subsequent choices of the most powerful people”
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992: 23).
Decision-making: a process influenced by investment
characteristics Any decision-making process is
inserted into an “interwoven streams of issues net-
works” (Langley et al. 1995); concurrent decision pro-
cesses within the same organization may be interrelated
because they share the same resources but also simply
because “they bathe within the same organizational
context, involving the same people, the same structural
design, the same strategies, and the same organizational
culture and traditions” (Langley et al. 1995: 273).
Dutton et al. (1989) empirical study has also shown
how relationships, or “linkages,” among issues are an
element which strongly influences decisions in organ-
izations. Figure 2 below illustrates these interwoven
streams of issues and how decisions (the arrows in the
figure below) happen to come out of the decision-
making flow.
In every organization, there is some competition
between (streams of) issues, for financial and human
(the time and energy of powerful managers) resources
(Langley et al. 1995) and investment projects which
compete against each other (Ross 1986).
Characteristics of investment projects do influence
the outcome of this organizational competition.6 Invest-
ment characteristics are numerous and diverse. Exam-
ples of characteristics are: investments importance to the
organization; their complexity, and the level of organi-
zational change they would entail; the number of actors
involved and the stimuli evoking them (threat or oppor-
tunity, level of urgency); the available solutions (ad hoc
or ready-made, internal or external). Investments can
also be categorized according to their functional object
(production, human resources, etc.) or according to their
strategic character or nature.
Research findings demonstrate that strategic char-
acter of investment issues play an important role in the
competition for resources. Several streams of
decision-making research (strategic process research,
organizational finance, and cost accounting) have
mentioned the importance of strategic character of
investment issues in decision making. Some research
mentions the quest for competitive advantage as a
driver of investment decision making (Burcher and
Lee 2000; Chen 1995; De Bodt and Bouquin 2001;
Putterill et al. 1996). Others note the decisional im-
portance of factors such as the link between invest-
ment decisions and a company’s strategic goals
(Alkaraan and Northcott 2006; Carr and Tomkins
1996; Maritan 2001; Segelod 1997; Van Cauwenbergh
et al. 1996) or the investment impact on product qual-
ity and competitive position (Butler et al. 1991). These
findings meet those of the “alternative” literature on
energy-efficiency investments, where the (absence of
a) link between energy-efficiency investments and a
company’s core business is often mentioned as a (neg-
ative) factor which plays an important role in the
decision-making surrounding investments (de Groot
et al. 2001; Harris et al. 2000; Parker et al. 2000; Sæle
et al. 2005; Sandberg and Söderström 2003; Sardianou
2008; Sorrell et al. 2000; Velthuijsen 1993; Weber
2000, 1997).7
Fig. 2 Organizational decision making as interwoven, driven
by linkages (Langley et al. 1995: 275)
6 Which may be a positive decision, a negative decision, or a
non-decision.
7 A more detailed review of this literature is made in Cooremans
(2011), in the sections “Capital Investment decision-making
literature” and “Alternative energy literature: empirical
findings.”
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Yet, investments are not (only) strategic for objective
reasons. They are interpreted as such by decision makers
and organizations, as are all data and decision events. At
the beginning of the decision-making process, issue di-
agnosis assesses and categorizes new data and events,
which are interpreted—“infused with meaning” (Dutton
and Jackson 1987)—at the individual and organizational
levels. During this process, some issues become “deci-
sion events” (Dutton et al. 1983). But, during the issue
diagnosis process, information is distorted by the use of
heuristics—rules of thumb, shortcuts, routines, which
decision-makers use to simplify complex problems—
and by cognitive biases, these “hidden decision’s traps”
(Hammond et al. 2001) common to all individuals. The
influence of heuristics and cognitive biases always dis-
torts information in the same way: Managers uncon-
sciously search for information supporting views,
beliefs, or hypotheses that they have long cherished
(Makridakis, in Mintzberg et al. 2005: 168). Moreover,
managers’ personal pre-existing knowledge systems act
as filters8 of organizational events. The organizational
context also influences how decision makers understand
and interpret issues. The meaning attributed to the same
event, and the type of reaction to this event, will therefore
be different from one organization to another. The same
kind of investment will be perceived as more or less
strategic by different decision makers and organizations.
But, beyond these differences in perceptions or
interpretations, how can we define the strategic char-
acter of an investment? Strategic process research has
highlighted the relation between the strategic character
of an investment project and the characteristics of the
decision to be made, and has studied how these char-
acteristics influence the decision-making process.
Strategic decisions are described as important, with a
high impact on the organization’s performance or sur-
vival, as uncertain and highly unstructured decisions.9
The more unstructured the decision to be made,
the higher the number of actors involved in the
decision-making process (Butler 1990; Cyert and
March 1963; Thompson 1967; Hickson et al.
1986). The higher the number of actors involved,
the more politicized (Miller, et al. 1996),10 longer,
sporadic, and cycling the decision-making process
(Desreumaux and Romelaer 2001; Hickson et al.
1986). In fact, we observe that strategic process
research describes and theorizes strategic invest-
ment decisions but does not investigate what is
that makes an investment strategic or, in other
words, what is that makes the strategic character
of an investment. Actually, we could not find any
satisfying11 definition of what “strategic” means in
the strategic decision-making literature.
The model of investment decision making brief-
ly described above is based on literature review
and theoretical exploration of the academic field of
decision making. Most parts of the model have
been studied and supported by theoretical and em-
pirical research. Our contribution is twofold; first-
ly, it lies in the assembling of various research
streams into one coherent and integrated model
of investment decision making; secondly, and this
is the focus of this paper, we have investigated
how investment strategic character influences in-
vestment decision making. In order to do so, we
have completed the theoretical framework defining
strategic character, which is described in the next
section.
Strategicity
Most strategic decisions are investment decisions be-
cause strategic decisions generally translate into re-
source allocations.12 Additionally, decision-making
research has shown that strategic character of
9 i.e., Decisions “that have not been encountered in quite the
same form and for which no predetermined and explicit set of
ordered responses exists in the organization” (Mintzberg et al.
1976: 246). “This is not the decision making under uncertainty
of the textbook, where alternatives are given even if their con-
sequences are not, but decision making under ambiguity, where
almost nothing is given or easily determined” (Mintzberg et al.
1976: 250).
10 “Politicality refers to the degree of influence which is brought
to bear on a decision and how this influence is distributed within
and without the organization… (Miller et al., in Clegg 1996:
300) The strength and distribution of influence, coupled with the
complexity of what is being decided, shape the process which
ensues” (idem: 301).
11 “Satisfying” here means a theoretical framework useful to
scholars to analyze investment decisions made by firms as well
as to decision makers to analyze investment projects.
8 “Executives’ experiences, values, and personalities affect their
field of vision (the directions they look and listen), selective
perception (what they actually see and hear), and interpretation
(how they attach meaning to what they see and hear)” (Hambrick
2007: 337).
12 For instance, out of the 25 strategic decisions studied by
Mintzberg et al. (1976), 22 were investment decisions.
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investment decisions matters, but just what does the
expression “strategic character” cover?
Dutton et al. (1989), in their seminal paper on
the dimensions of strategic issues,13 provide a
useful categorization in this regard. Having defined
strategic issues as “events, developments or trends
that are perceived by decision-makers as having
the potential to affect their organization’s perfor-
mance” (Dutton et al. 1989: 380), they differenti-
ate between analytic issue characteristics and issue
content characteristics. They define analytic char-
acteristics as characteristics “which can be used to
order issues in their relation to one another (e.g.,
by their duration, by their impact, by their inter-
connectedness) … [whereas] content dimensions
describe classifications into discrete groups” (Dutton et
al. 1989: 381).14 Examples of issues analytic char-
acteristics15 are the magnitude and implications of
their impact on an organization, their certainty,
novelty, time pressure, and causal relationships,
whereas issue content characteristics16 concern
the organization’s mission and role, its resources,
its environment, its businesses, and its relation-
ships with outside entities (Dutton et al. 1989:
389). This categorization is useful to develop a
conceptual framework for strategic investment
decisions.
As already mentioned (see end of previous sec-
tion), strategy process literature has mainly studied
analytic characteristics of strategic investment deci-
sions, without making reference to the content char-
acteristics of investment projects. Therefore, in
strategy process research, decisions are defined as
“strategic” based on their analytic characteristics
only: Decisions are strategic because of their high
potential impact on the organization or because
they are highly uncertain or unstructured. However,
to define the strategic nature of a decision simply
by saying that it is important and unstructured
seems insufficient to identify and analyze strategic
investment decisions.
Strategic nature must also be analyzed according to
investment content. As expressed by Maritan and
Schendel (1997: 262): “how can we really under-
stand the process of making strategic decisions
without explicitly considering the strategy content
of the decisions and how it links to outcome? To
see the decision process and content as separable
is wrong.” Indeed, Maritan (2001), in her study
of 29 investment decisions in a large pulp and
paper company, has shown that investment con-
tent does influence decisions in four ways: Firstly,
it influences the hierarchical level in which the
project is handled; secondly, it influences the
hierarchical level of its “champion”; thirdly, in-
vestment content influences the mode of approval
of the project (more or less formal or informal);
fourthly, content influences the level of procedur-
al rationality.17 The Dutton et al. 1989 empirical
study also demonstrates the importance of content
characteristics compared with analytic character-
istics. Issue content characteristics are mentioned
almost as often by the decision makers inter-
viewed. Content characteristics most influential
in decision making are those related to an organ-
ization’s mission and role, its resources, its busi-
nesses, and its relationships with outside entities
(Dutton et al. 1989). In fact, content character-
istics seem connected with factors we have iden-
tified in our literature review as influencing
investment decision making, i.e., the factors “link
[of an investment project] with a company’s stra-
tegic goals” and “quest for competitive advan-
tage” (see first paragraph, p. 7). However, to
define the strategic nature of an investment by
saying that its content is related to organization’s
mission and role, to its strategic goals, quest for
competitive advantage, or businesses, seems, again,
rather vague.
13 In this paper, Dutton et al. study the dimensions that decision
makers employ to make strategic issue diagnosis or, in other
words, to recognize, differentiate, and sort strategic issues, and
how these dimensions are different from the ones researchers
assume that decision makers use.
14 A complete list of issue dimensions identified in three sources
is given by Dutton et al. in Table 1 of their paper (1989: 383);
full list of issue dimensions generated by the Dutton et al. survey
and of their frequency is given in Table 3 of their paper (1989:
388).
15 Identified in three sources and by their own research (Dutton
et al. 1989: 383 and 388).
16 Most frequently cited by respondents to their survey (Dutton
et al. 1989: 383 and 388).
17 Procedural rationality can be defined (Dean and Sharfman
1993, 1996) as the importance given by decision makers to
information collection and how they trust this information and
base their decisions on it.
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Therefore, on the whole, definitions provided by
the different streams of decision-making research
are not precise or comprehensive enough to qual-
ify an investment strategic character. To evaluate
the strategic character of investment decisions, we
need to examine investment content and analyze
how it enables an organization to strengthen its
strategic position. To conduct this analysis, we
have to draw from the concepts of another vast
research field in strategy, the field of “strategy
content.” An important field of business manage-
ment, “strategy content” literature offers definitions
of strategy and solutions to make the best strategic
choices.
Strategy ultimately consists of creating a dura-
ble competitive advantage.18 Accordingly, we can
consider that the main constituent of the “strategic
character of an investment” is this investment’s
contribution to a firm’s competitiveness. Invest-
ment content determines investment contribution
to core business and to an organization’s compet-
itive advantage. Therefore, strategic character
depends on investment content. Based on this reasoning,
we will use the following definition: An investment is
“strategic if it contributes to create, maintain or develop
a sustainable competitive advantage” (Cooremans
2011).19
This definition implies, firstly, that an invest-
ment, or an investment decision, is not simply
strategic or non-strategic, contrary to what it is
generally (implicitly) described by the decision-
making literature. Strategic decision making is a
continuum, where decisions can range anywhere
from non-strategic to wholly strategic. The more
strategic an investment is, or in other words, the
more it contributes to competitive advantage, the
more important it is to a firm’s performance or
even survival. We suggest the word “strategicity”
to express and describe the strategic character—or
strategic nature—of an investment.
This definition implies, secondly, that the main
constituent of the “strategic character of an invest-
ment” is this investment’s impact on a firm’s compet-
itiveness. What are the indicators which allow
measurement of competitive advantage generated by
a strategic decision?
According to Michael Porter, “competitive ad-
vantage grows fundamentally out of value a firm
is able to create for its buyers that exceeds the
firm’s cost of creating it” (Porter 1985: 3). Value
is what buyers are willing to pay for what a firm
provides them and is measured by total revenue.
Two theoretical approaches have defined the
means to build superior value at a lower cost:
the “activities approach” (leaded by Michael Por-
ter) and the “strategic resources approach.” The
first approach is centered on the concept of activ-
ities which are “the basic units of competitive
advantage.” The second theoretical approach is
based on the concept of strategic resources which,
according to the Resource Based View (RBV)
(on strategy), are the founding elements of com-
petitive advantage. These two approaches agree
on a bi-dimensional concept of competitive ad-
vantage. These two dimensions are, on one hand,
value (which a firm is able to create for its
customers) and on the other hand, cost (of creating this
value). The two approaches to competitive ad-
vantage only differ in the means of developing
superior value and reducing costs: choice of ac-
tivities for one and resources development for the
other.
However, an analysis of several theoretical
frameworks—strategic risk, resource dependence
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and RBV—leads to
propose taking risk as a third dimension of com-
petitive advantage, supplementing the value and
costs dimensions (Cooremans 201120). Therefore,
we suggest enlarging the definition of competitive
advantage by saying that competitive advantage is
a three-dimensional concept, formed of three inter-
related constituents: costs, value, and risks. We
18 Indeed, most authors in the field agree on the following
elements which are deducted from Porter’s principles of com-
petitive strategy (Porter 1985, 1980): Strategy sets out the basic
direction of the organization, by specifying the organization’s
long-term activities and goals, according to its internal resour-
ces and to external factors, in order to build a durable compet-
itive advantage (Johnson and Scholes 1999: 27).
19 For a more detailed discussion about the concept and defini-
tion of “strategic nature,” please refer to the section “Defining
strategic” in Cooremans ((2011) pp 486–487).
20 In this paper, content and definition of competitive advantage
concept are discussed in detail.
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have designed the figure on the next page to very
simply illustrate the three dimensions of competi-
tive advantage:
Using the theoretical framework described
above, we can explain why strategicity is an im-
portant driver of investment decision making as
follows: A decision-making process only starts if
the new decision event, the “initial idea” (Desreumaux
and Romelaer 2001) is interpreted, in the diagnos-
tic phase, as a stimulus important enough to trig-
ger action (Mintzberg et al. 1976); however,
crossing the action threshold is not enough to
ensure a positive decision because of the organi-
zational competition existing between streams of
issues or projects (Langley et al. 1995; Ross
1986). An investment project perceived and cate-
gorized as non-strategic will most probably lose
the competition and will be excluded from the
decisional stream, to end up as a no-decision; a
category little studied (Bachrach and Baratz 1962).
It may also result in a negative decision. However,
the highly strategic nature of an investment may
also complicate and slow down the decision-making
process because of the novelty and complexity it
implies. In summary, the strategic nature of an invest-
ment project is an important and necessary condition but
not always sufficient to automatically entail a positive
decision.
Empirical research
As shown in the previous section, the influence of
investment characteristics—and, in particular, of
investment strategic character—on investment deci-
sions has been demonstrated by a large amount of
research. Yet, the modalities of this influence need
to be better understood and described. This was
the goal of our empirical study. Based on the
theoretical framework described above, this study
was conducted in Geneva, Switzerland, from 2006
to 2007.
Data collection
The research was undertaken in collaboration with
the University of Geneva Business School (HEC)
and the Geneva Energy Office (ScanE) and is based
on interviews and questionnaires submitted to major
electricity consumers of the Geneva canton (sites
consuming more than 1 GWh of electricity per
year), participating in a peak demand-side management
program. Thirty-five companies supervising 61
buildings or industrial sites participated in the sur-
vey, 19 of which are active in the secondary sector
(metalworking, clock- and watch-making, chemical
and pharmaceutical industries) and the rest of
which are active in the tertiary sector (chain stores,
parking lots, shopping malls, conference/exhibition
centers).
Data collection consisted of a two-step survey:
(1) On the occasion of a semi-directive interview
with the company manager responsible for energy
issues (usually the facility or technical manager),
a questionnaire is filled in; (2) A subsequent
questionnaire was completed by a top finance
manager. Some questions were identical to those
of the first questionnaire in order to check for
different views on the same issues between man-
agers in charge of energy and finance managers.
Only 18 “finance questionnaires” have been col-
lected (11 secondary sector and seven tertiary
sector companies; 14 of these companies are me-
dium to big, with more than 250 employees).
Although the sample size is small, data collected
give interesting indications on businesses’ general
investment behavior and on energy-efficiency in-
vestment behavior. They also enable a compari-
son with the De Bodt and Bouquin (2001) survey
(44 usable questionnaires, out of the thousand
sent out by mail), from which most of the ques-
tions regarding general investment behavior were
taken.
Strategicity measurement
According to our definition, the more an invest-
ment decision contributes to competitive advan-
tage, the more strategic it is. Thus, to measure
strategic character (or “strategicity”) of an invest-
ment, one has to measure its contribution to com-
petitive advantage in each dimension: value, costs,
and risk. To estimate the strategic character of
energy-efficiency investment to the companies of
the sample, we asked managers (finance managers
and energy managers) to estimate the impact of the
adoption of energy-efficient technologies on their
company, in terms of risks, costs, and value. The
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following question was submitted to energy and
finance managers:
Respondents were asked to give a value from 1
to 521 to each of the constituents—risks, costs, and
value—analyzed by questions 2–5. By aggregating
the answers, a scale of interval was built, allowing
measurement of the strategic dimension of an
energy-efficiency investment, which is thus spread
out from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 15.
Results and discussion
General investment behavior
Results concerning the relative importance of the fi-
nancial and strategic logic in investment choices and
businesses’ general investment behavior will be dis-
cussed in this section. In this respect, the most impor-
tant conclusions are the following: (1) profitability
plays an important but not decisive role in investment
decision making; (2) the diagnostic phase is crucial;
(3) there is competition between investment projects;
(4) investment projects which are considered as more
strategic win the competition. Another important
finding of our research is unorthodox practices of
businesses in investment choices. These various points
will be discussed in the following pages.
According to the mainstream approach on invest-
ment decision-making, an investment is decided
according to its profitability. Three capital budget-
ing tools proposed by capital investment theory are
most often used to assess an investment’s profit-
ability22: payback period, Net Present Value (NPV),
and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) methods. These
methods specify the modalities fixing the discount
rate and take into account the risk attached to an
investment project.
Our research results help confirm that investment
profitability plays an important role in decision mak-
ing, as shown by various questionnaire responses:
Profitability analysis is mandatory for an investment
project, irrespective of its category, for an overwhelm-
ing majority of companies.23 Three quarters of the
22 Investment profitability measures the relationship between
the capital invested and the income which ensues from the
investment. For a well-written description of capital budgeting
methods, I suggest the following reading “Finance for Manag-
ers” pp. 140–170, Harvard Business Essential; Harvard Busi-
ness School Press, Boston, MA (2003).
23 Eighty-seven percent of positive answers in our sample. See
Table 3 of the Appendix for detailed results.
21 Figures of the scale correspond to: 10completely unimpor-
tant; 20not important; 30moderately important; 40important;
50very important.
2-5      Do you think that the adoption of energy-efficient technologies is important
 [for your company] for the following reasons?
              Classify in ascending order (1 = the least important – 5 = the most important)     
2_5_3 Risks reduction         ___________ 
Please specify which ones  _________________________________ 
2_5_4 Costs reduction       ___________ 
Please specify which ones  _________________________________ 
2_5_5 Products value increase      ___________ 
       Please specify which ones  _________________________________ 
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financial managers disagree with the assertion that
“financial evaluation of the investments has, after all,
a small influence on the final decision”. Profitability
calculations are considered as “decisive” in the
choices made by a quarter of the respondents (28 %)
and as “important” by 50 % of the respondents.
However, the influence of profitability on invest-
ment decision making is far from being exclusive. As
admitted by the quasi-totality of financial managers
who responded24 the “profitability of an investment is
not sufficient to entail a positive decision.” A majority
of financial managers25 confirm, on the other hand,
that “a project can be realized even if it is not profit-
able.” These results are similar to those of previous
research, in particular, that of De Bodt and Bouquin
(2001).
The influence of profitability on investment decision
making is even secondary, as demonstrated by our re-
search, because of the influence of the three following
factors: (1) power relationships between company
departments influence the investment process26; (2) in-
vestment amount and category determine the procedure,
the analytic and capital budgeting tools used, profitabil-
ity requirements, and the different steps a project has to
follow; investment category appears to influence also
the type of financing (self-financing or borrowing); (3)
strategic investments have more chances of being
selected.
Issue diagnosis plays an important role in the
decision-making process and therefore in investment
choices. Two elements in companies’ answers show its
importance. First, investment projects result more of-
ten from opportunities perceived at the operational
level than they result from a systematic search for a
relationship with a company’s goals; this implies an
open decision-making process in the beginning.
Second, in the majority of cases, budgets were
not defined in advance but only after identification
of investment opportunities. A formal procedure of
investment control exists in a large majority of
companies (approximately four out of five). Invest-
ment amount influences this procedure in the ma-
jority of the companies questioned,27 as well as
the stages that the investment project proposal has
to follow.28
Investment categorization plays a crucial role in
this formal procedure. Almost all companies clas-
sify investment projects according to a pre-existing
typology. The category chosen subsequently influ-
ences the type of analysis applied to an investment
project (such as analyses of profitability and risk,
or commercial, technical, legal, and ecological
analyses) and the financial methods used to assess
its profitability.29 The investment category also
influences the stages that a project has to follow
in 44 % of companies.30 Table 1 below summarizes
these results:
The Table 2 on the next page shows investment
categories chosen by financial managers as being the
closest to the investment categories used in their com-
pany. “Investments to maintain or renew existing pro-
duction capacities” is the category recognized by the
largest number of companies.31 The second invest-
ment category chosen (72 % of Geneva respondents)
is the category “investments to increase productivity
of existing means of production.” Thus, the categories
most frequently used by companies are categories
related to core business.
Categorization of investment projects by compa-
nies and its huge influence on the decision-making
process and therefore on investment choices, provides
29 In 61 % of companies, i.e., 11 yes, 6 no, and 1 non-answer to
question F 9–10 (“Do you apply different types of analysis to an
investment project according to investment category?” Yes, No)
and to question F 9–14 (“Does the financial method used to assess
profitability depend on the investment category?” Yes, No).
30 Eight yes, nine no, and one non-answer to question F 9-19-2
(“Do the stages that a project has to follow depend on the
investment category?” Yes, No).
31 Seventy-eight percent, or 14 out of 18. It is also the first
category chosen by respondents in the de Bodt and Bouquin
survey, although with a lower score (41 % of the answers, or 18
companies out of 44).
26 As theorized by the political model of decision-making de-
scribed in the paragraph “Decision making: a process influenced
by actors’ power”. We received 14 positive answers out of 17
respondents to the assertion: “Investment decisions are influ-
enced by the balance of power between a firm’s departments”.
Please also refer to Table 3 of the Appendix.
27 Seventy-six percent of the answers, i.e., 13 yes, 4 no, and 1
non-answer to question F 9–11 (“Does the procedure depend on
the investment amount?” Yes, No.)
28 Eighty-eight percent of the answers, i.e., 15 positive answers
out of 17 and 1 non-answer to question F 9-19-1 (“Do the stages
that a project has to follow depend on the investment amount?”
Yes, No).
25 Ten positive answers out of 17 respondents.
24 Fifteen out of 17.
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explanatory value to another important aspect of our
theoretical model: the existence of competition be-
tween investments.32 This element is also confirmed
by the fact that the “existence of other more im-
portant investments” is considered as the first bar-
rier to energy-efficiency investments by the
financial managers in our survey, as well as by
companies in the De Groot et al. (2001) survey.
De Groot et al. do not specify what these “more
important investments” are. They simply note that
“the most important barrier for firms is the exis-
tence of other investment opportunities that are
considered more promising or important, or… more
attractive” (De Groot et al. 2001: 726). But they
indicate elsewhere that “energy saving is just one of
the criteria on which a new technology is judged
and that there are other complementary benefits
such as increased capacity and improved product
quality that are considered along with energy sav-
ing” (idem: 723).
Although we did not systematically collect infor-
mation about what respondents in our survey meant by
“more important investments,” some respondents re-
sponsible for energy management mentioned during
the interview that more important investments were
“investments to obtain certifications, or investments in
production” (company no. 26, steel industry), “invest-
ments in means of production” (company no. 29, steel
industry), “investments in means of production or to
develop new selling points” (company no. 32, watch-
maker), “investments in machines” (company no. 33,
watchmaker). These descriptions also correspond to
the investment categories indicated as the most
frequently used by companies (as described in the
table above). We can therefore consider that “more
important investments” are those which are directly
linked with a company’s core business: in other words,
those which are strategic investments. Therefore,
another central point of our theoretical framework
gains explanatory value, which states that strategic
investments33 have more chance to win the organiza-
tional competition existing between investment
projects. This is also supported by the fact that, in
our research, 16 financial managers out of 17 agreed
with the assertion: “Above all, a project must contribute
to the realization of the company’s strategic goals”
(40 companies out of 44 in the De Bodt and Bouquin
survey, 2001).
Thus, strategic character appears as being more im-
portant than profitability in investment choices, at least
for companies’ financial managers. This would explain
why companies do not adopt certain technological
advances, even when they consider them profitable, as
is the case for the companies questioned by De Groot et
Table 2 Investment categories by order of frequency
Investment categories Number of
citations
To maintain or renew existing production
capacities
14
To increase productivity of existing means
of production
13
To improve production process 9
To reduce energy consumption 9




Marketing of new products 8
Research 7
Product quality improvement 7








33 As per our definition, an investment is strategic if it contributes to
create, maintain, or develop a sustainable competitive advantage.
Table 1 Influence of investment category





Type of analysis (question F 9–10) 11 61 %
Capital budgeting tool used (question
F 9–14)
11 61 %
Investment steps (question F 9-19-2)
(one non-answer for each question)
8 44 %
32 Competition between investments is described in the para-
graph on Decision making: a process influenced by investment
characteristics in the section “A new model of investment
decision making.”
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al. (2001)34 and by capital-rationing firms surveyed by
Ross (1986). This may also explain why unprofitable
investments may be chosen, as indicated by a majority
of financial managers in our Geneva survey.35
Another interesting issue regarding general invest-
ment behavior is brought into evidence by our research:
a lack of conformity of investment practices with capital
investment theory prescriptions. Indeed, results show
unorthodox behavior by companies in our survey, re-
garding the capital budgeting methods used.36 The fol-
lowing aspects in particular must be noted:
Discount rate. Only 60 % of the companies sur-
veyed fix the discount rate by basing it on the cost
of shareholders’ equity and the cost of loan
(weighted average cost of capital). Fifteen percent
of companies fix the discount rate in a fixed way.
Risk is taken into account in discount rate setting
in less than one company out of five.
Time value of money. Three quarters of the com-
panies surveyed use a dynamic method to assess
profitability (NPVor IRR) and the simple pay-back
method at the same time. Some companies, how-
ever, (at least two) use only the pay-back method
and with a long duration of 5 to 6 years.
Risk. Project risk analysis is compulsory for only
40 % of companies surveyed.37
Time horizon. Strong pressure in the short-term is
indicated by several respondents in the interviews.
As expressed in a rather emblematic way by the
general manager of the Geneva subsidiary of an
American company (company no. 30, coverage of
ceramic surfaces with metallic powders alloys; total
energy costs in Geneva08 % of the turnover, elec-
tricity costs04 % of turnover), “1 year [to get back
the initial investment capital], we get the money at
once, 2 years we need to fight, 3 years, we never get
it. ‘Waiting’ is a forbidden word in our company.”38
Under these conditions, numerous opportunities for
attractive investments are eliminated.
Outside financing and leverage. The large majority
of companies in our sample are self-financed and
are uninterested by a loan, even at a reduced rate of
interest, thus giving up the advantages of financial
leverage. The same result was also found by a
survey of International Finance Corporation (IFC)
(2006) on Russian companies’ practices regarding
investments in energy efficiency: “More than 60 %
of companies believe that insufficient funds is the
key obstacle hampering energy efficiency projects…
However… only every fourth company has applied
for outside financing”39 (IFC, 2006: 34). Discussing
these findings, ICF notes that “it is curious that over
one-third of those who did not apply for loans due to
”sufficient funds“ also mentioned problems related
to insufficient financial resources for energy efficien-
cy” (idem, p. 35). IFC explains these findings by the
fact that many companies do not understand the
advantages of financial leverage. Based on our the-
oretical framework, our explanation would be that it
is because these investments are not considered as
strategic, so that internal financial resources are not
granted and outside financing is not considered an
option. For example, the person in charge of energy
in company no. 33 (watchmaker) mentioned that the
company borrows to purchase production equip-
ment, but that, regarding investments for operations,
the rule is self-financing.
Based on our findings, we can conclude that the
way a project is categorized influences the procedure
and the profitability assessment method, as well as
37 Only four companies out of the 16 which answered question
F 9-15-3 take risk into account at the project level to fix the
discount rate.
36 A conclusion which would support the Rigby (2002) analysis
which questions the quality of financial calculations made by
companies: “In addition to the problem that organisations did
not know how to save energy, it was also shown by market
research studies carried out for BRECSU [Building Research
Energy Conservation Support] that organisations did not know
how to assess the economic potential of their investments in
energy efficiency. The weaknesses in the financial methodolo-
gies used by energy managers and estates departments for
estimating the profitability of energy efficient criteria principally
included making errors in the estimate of the inflation rate and
changes to future fuel prices. The result of these errors was to
render “many investment appraisal analyses meaningless”
(Building Research Energy Conservation Support, BRECSU,
1991: 6 quoted by Rigby 2002: 15).
39 “and nearly 90 % of them were successfully granted loans”
(IFC, 2006: 34).
34 “The responses shown here concern technologies about
which firms had indicated earlier in the survey that they are
aware of their existence, that the technologies were considered
as being profitable, but that they were still not implemented as
yet” (de Groot et al. 2001: 727).
35 See Table 3 of the Appendix for complete results.
38 Interview of February 22, 2007.
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profitability requirements and financing. In the context
of projects categorization and of competition between
projects, and beyond questions regarding businesses’
unorthodox financial practices, the strategic character
of investment projects appears as the primary driver of
investment choices, while investment profitability
appears as a generally necessary but insufficient con-
dition. The answers of the Geneva managers hereby
support the findings of previous studies regarding the
respective influences of financial and strategic aspects
of investment projects, as well as the validity of our
model of investment decision making.40
Since strategic character is the main driver of invest-
ment decision making, it is important to assess how
strategically energy-efficiency investments are perceived
by businesses. The next section will discuss this point.
Energy-efficiency investments behavior
Strategic character of energy-efficiency investments
Energy-efficiency investments exist as a category for
almost half of the 18 companies which responded to
our questionnaire, in a similar proportion in the tertia-
ry and secondary sectors. Indeed, the category “Invest-
ments intended to reduce energy consumption”41 was
selected by 53 % of companies.42 It is the third most
frequently mentioned category (along with the catego-
ries “Investments for production process improvement,”
“For machinery & equipment legal conformity,” and
“Replacement”).
The fact that energy-efficiency investments do—or do
not—exist as a category in companies has never been
discussed in the energy-efficiency literature. Actually,
the issue of investment categorization, in spite of its
consequences on investment choices, has been almost
completely left out of the general investment literature as
well, probably because there has been no need to look for
any special treatment applied to a category in particular.
How strategically are energy-efficiency invest-
ments considered? This is an important question since
strategic character is an essential condition for an
investment project to be chosen. If energy-efficiency
investments are perceived as non-strategic, their chan-
ces of being chosen will be rather low.
According to our definition, the more an investment
contributes to create or to strengthen a company’s
competitive advantage, the more strategic it is. Com-
petitive advantage is a three-dimensional concept,
composed of three interrelated constituents: costs,
value, and risks (as represented by Fig. 3 on the next
page). Based on the measurement tool described in the
methodology section (see p. 11–12), energy and
finance managers were asked to rate—from 1 to 5—
the contribution of energy-efficiency investments to
decreasing risks, decreasing costs, and increasing
product value in their company.
Three main themes emerge from our empirical re-
search. First, energy-efficiency investments are per-
ceived as non- to moderately strategic by our
respondents. Second, of the three variables which
compose the strategic character of an investment, the
variable “Costs” is considered most important.43
Third, arithmetic hides a large variety of answers, both
between companies (including companies operating in
the same business sector) and within companies (be-
tween managers of the energy and finance functions).
Let us further examine these three themes.
First, on average, energy-efficiency investments are
considered “not strategic” to “moderately strategic” for
the company by questionnaire respondents. Figure 4 on
page 18 shows how managers assess energy-efficiency
contribution to the three constituents of competitive
advantage. Energy managers’ and finance managers’
results are presented on the left and right sides of the
figure, respectively. The average score is 9.1 out of 15
for energy managers44 and 8.6 out of 15 for finance
managers.45 If we divide by 3 to reduce these figures
41 See fourth line of Table 2.
42 i.e., Nine companies out of the 17 having answered this
question; 1 no-answer.
44 That is the sum of the means of the results for variables
2_5_3, 2_5_4, and 2_5_5. See the section “Strategic nature
concept measurement”.
43 Regarding the question of costs, it is interesting to note that,
contrary to an idea commonly held but rarely discussed, energy
costs are not automatically higher in proportion to turnover in
companies of the secondary sector than in those of the tertiary
sector.
45 That is the sum of the means of the results for variables
7_5_3, 7_5_4, and 7_5_5. See the section “Strategic nature
concept measurement”. According to the Student’s t test, the
difference between the results of energy managers and those of
finance managers is not statistically significant.
40 The fact that strategic investments win the organizational com-
petition for resources is described in the paragraph on Decision
making: a process influenced by investment characteristics in the
section “A new model of investment decision-making.”
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from 15 to 5, we obtain scores of 3 out of 5 for energy
managers and 2.9 out of 5 for financial managers. Based
on these results and according to the measurement scale
defined46 (see also the methodology section, p. 12), we
can conclude that energy-efficiency investments are
considered as “not important” to “moderately impor-
tant” by the respondent managers.
The dispersion of the answers between the two
groups (energy and finance managers) for the three
variables (risks, costs, and value) presents significant
differences. About 50 % of the energy managers con-
sider that adopting energy-efficient technology is in no
way important to risk reduction, while the modal
choice is the inverse for finance managers: nearly half
of them consider the adoption of this technology as
moderately important to very important to risk reduc-
tion. For finance managers as well as for energy man-
agers, “risk” means “price risk,” i.e., future price
increase or price instability. Energy outages are per-
ceived as a minor risk by companies, only a small
minority of which are equipped with a backup system
to produce electricity in case of a grid breakdown.47
The non- to moderately strategic character of
energy-efficiency investments for managers in our
research is supported by two additional results. On
one hand, the contribution of these investments to
improving their company’s competitive position is
considered as not important by energy managers as
well as for finance managers.48 On the other hand, the
importance of these investments for the corporate im-
age (corporate image is a strategic resource in strategic
management literature) is estimated as moderately im-
portant by energy managers and as of rather low
importance by finance managers49.
The second striking conclusion is the fact that, out
of the three dimensions which compose the strategic
character of an investment, it is the constituent “Costs”
which is considered as the most important.50 This is
the case for all respondents (energy and finance man-
agers) and for all industries.
The prospect of energy costs reduction is, however,
not as stimulating as one might believe; indeed, in the
De Groot et al. (2001) study, the fact that energy costs
are not important enough was the third factor blocking
the adoption of energy-efficient technology. This an-
swer is especially interesting because companies ques-
tioned by De Groot et al. (2001) were active in energy-
intensive industries51 and had energy costs amounting
to a rather high percentage of their turnover (approx-
imately 10 %). If energy costs are considered not
important by managers, the perspective of an energy
costs reduction is not a very powerful factor in moti-
vating them toward investing in energy-efficient tech-
nology. Thus, energy cost-reduction is a stimulating
factor, but not always sufficient to entail positive deci-
sions regarding energy-efficiency investments.
Again, the importance of the strategic character of
an investment provides explanatory power of corpo-
rate investment choices, as these results show that
energy costs must not be interpreted according to a
financial approach but according to a strategic ap-
proach. For certain companies confronted with com-
petition for prices and low costs, such as the
machinery or metals industries, low costs are a strate-
gic necessity of competitiveness and thus, of survival.
48 Question 7-5-7: “Do you think that adoption of energy effi-
cient technologies is important for your company for bench-
marking reasons (competition pressure).” Average of the
answers is of 2.2 for energy managers (35 answer) and of 2.1
for finance managers (15 answers). Please classify in ascending
order (10 the least important; 50the most important).
51 Chemical, basic metals, metals, machinery, food, paper, hor-
ticulture, construction materials, and textiles industries.
46 Let us remember that figures of the scale correspond to: 10
completely unimportant; 20not important; 30moderately im-
portant; 40 important; 50very important.
47 However, the answers vary considerably between companies,
according to their individual experiences in terms of electricity
disruptions. 50 “Costs reduction” entailed by energy-efficiency investments
is rated generally higher than 4 (out of a maximum of 5) and
often close to 5, while the dimensions “risks reduction” and “
increase of products value” almost always obtain a score lower
than 3 out of 5.
Value 
Risks Costs 
Fig. 3 The three dimensions of competitive advantage
49 Question 7-5-8: Do you think that adoption of energy-
efficient technologies is important for your company for the
following reasons? Corporate image towards clients
___________. Please classify in ascending order (10the least
important – 50 the most important). (Average of the answers is
of 3.1 for energy managers (35 answers) and of 2.6 for finance
managers (15 answers).)
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This is the situation faced by companies, nos. 23 and
25, in our sample, as illustrated by a statement from
the energy manager of company no. 25 (machinery
industry): “we constantly fight to make as well [in
terms of quality] as the Japanese, at lower costs.”
However, for most companies, the cost dimension is
not a priority in energy-efficiency investments
decision-making. For these companies, energy costs
are considered a somewhat necessary evil.
The third important conclusion of our findings regard-
ing the strategic character of energy-efficiency invest-
ments is the variety of interpretations, which is observed.
Variance of the answers between managers of the same
groups is extremely high52 as well as variance between
companies, even within the same industry (as shown in
details in Table 3 of the Appendix). Generally speaking,
investments in energy efficiency obtain a higher score in
the three dimensions of competitive advantage (“risks,”
“costs,” and “value”) with managers of the tertiary sector
than with those of the secondary sector.
Yet, as a general finding of our empirical research,
we can state that energy-efficiency investments are
considered at best, on average, as moderately impor-
tant by respondent managers.
Energy-efficiency investment behavior
According to our theoretical framework, non-strategic
investments lose the competition for human and finan-
cial resources which exists within each company.
Therefore, the low strategic character of energy-
efficiency investments should have negative conse-
quences. This is supported by our findings, as de-
scribed in this section.
Two questions, F-9-1653 and F-10-6,54 in particular,
aimed at highlighting differences in the treatment be-
tween general investments and energy-efficiency invest-
ments. Question F-9-16 investigates the time horizon
used by companies to assess investment profitability (all
investment categories; several answers possible).
Among companies which responded to this question,
72 % declare taking the life span of equipment as the
forecasting horizon for their profitability assessment and
almost 40 % mention the strategic horizon of the project
as the time horizon for their profitability assessment.55
According to these answers, investment duration for
energy-efficiency equipment should therefore last about
15 to 20 years.56
Yet, profitability horizons for energy-efficiency
investments indicated by the 18 companies (having
responded to question F-10-6)57 are much shorter:
53 9.16 Time horizon for profitability assessment is primarily
determined by:
(Please mark adequate compartments)
O Fixed duration identical for all projects?
O Lifespan of equipments?
O Reasonable time horizon for forecasting?
O Strategic dimension of project
O Other? Please precise: _______________
54 Question F 10_6. For the profitability study (if realized),
which was the time horizon of the energy-efficiency project
(in number of years)? ________ years
52 They ranged from 4 to 13 (out of a maximum of 15) for
energy managers and from 5 to 13 (out of 15) for finance
managers.
56 Energy-consuming installations such as HCV (heating cool-
ing ventilation) have a life span of 15 to 20 years.
57 See Footnote 62 above.















"Strategicity" finance managers: 8,6 sur 15
Fig. 4 Strategic character of
energy-efficiency invest-
ments for energy and
finance managers
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2 years (two companies), 3 to 5 years (four compa-
nies), and 10 years (two companies). Therefore, com-
panies’ practices regarding energy-efficiency
investments contradict their answers regarding general
investments.
These findings can be interpreted as proof of a dif-
ferent and unfavorable treatment applied against energy-
efficiency investments. This interpretation is supported
by a statement given by the energymanager of company
no. 31 (Swiss company, electronics industry), who, dur-
ing the interview, mentioned a duration of 3 years for
investments in energy efficiency but a duration of
10 years for “production tool” investments. Thus, com-
panies would allow longer durations for investments in
the production tool. This would explain why, although
companies indicate life span of equipment as the basis
for investment duration, energy-efficiency investment
duration is often much shorter.
This would also be further proof of the role played by
strategic character in investment choices: investments in
production tool are generally considered highly strate-
gic, i.e., significantly contributing to core business.58
Therefore, they would benefit from less stringent selec-
tion methods and easier access to capital.
Conclusion
Investment categorization exists in an overwhelming
majority of companies. Categorization strongly influen-
ces investment control procedure, profitability assess-
ment methods, profitability requirements, investment
financing, and, ultimately, investment choices.
In the context of project categorization and of com-
petition between projects, the strategic character of
investment projects appears as the primary driver of
investment choices. When an investment is perceived
as important for core business, access to financial
resources is easier. We can interpret in this way the
fact that budgetary constraints come in only at eighth
position as a hindering factor to energy-efficiency
investments for the Dutch companies questioned by,
de Groot et al. 2001.59
Diversity in companies’ investment (general and
energy efficiency) behavior is another important
finding of our research. Diversity is observed in all
the aspects analyzed by our research: investment con-
trol procedures (methods of analysis and of profitabil-
ity assessment, fixation of the discount rate,
investment duration), energy-efficiency investment
behavior, and perceptions of energy-efficiency invest-
ments’ strategic character. This diversity is noticeable
even between companies active in the same business
sector and which present the same characteristics (as
shown in Table 4 of the Appendix).
More research is needed to explain the diversity
observed in firms’ investment behavior as well as to
better understand the modalities and consequences of
project categorization in investment choices. The in-
fluence of investments’ strategic character on invest-
ment duration, discount rate applied, and financing,
especially, has to be further investigated. Still, our
results are coherent with the new model of decision
making that we propose, as well as with previous
research in the fields of decision making and of
energy-efficiency investments.
Regarding energy-efficiency investments, more re-
search is also needed, which could take any or all of
the following four directions: (1) a large number of
companies should be surveyed in order to know if they
use the energy-efficiency investment category (our sam-
ple size was only 18 companies). This could be done in
different countries, to look for possible cultural
differences, and by using a dynamic method to
look for changes over time. (2) When energy-
efficiency investments do exist as a category, re-
search should look at what the selection methods
are and if they are more stringent than those
applied to other investment categories. (3) When
energy-efficiency investments do not exist as a
category, how energy efficiency is taken into ac-
count by companies in their decision-making pro-
cesses of investments not directly concerned with
energy use or consumption (but which have an
impact on it). (4) What happens when an energy-
efficiency project cannot be categorized at the
beginning of the decision-making process because
this investment category does not exist; in other
words, what are the consequences of a non-
categorization on the important step of issue diag-
nosis, at the beginning of decision-making process.
Our hypothesis regarding this last point is that
non-categorization entails slowing of the decision-
making process, or prevents it from starting at all59 With an average score of 2.8 out of 5.
58 As per our definition
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(a situation which would contribute to explaining
why energy audits sometimes never translate into
investment projects).
If we apply our decision-making model60 to
energy-efficiency investments, taking the case of a
company considering energy as a low strategic issue,
the following reasoning can be developed, based on
our empirical results:
Organizational context. Corporate culture regard-
ing energy and energy efficiency is low, and the
company’s dominant logic does not consider ener-
gy issues as strategic issues. Therefore, the compa-
ny does not effectively manage energy use; it
simply uses energy (Tunnessen 2004). With no
energy management, energy is invisible not only
in physical terms but also in managerial terms.
Investment characteristics. An energy-efficiency in-
vestment project is [perceived as] not or weakly
strategic. Whether opportunity or threat, stimulus
to this investment is weak. Positive impact on the
company is perceived as being low (or impact may
even be potentially negative as, for instance, in case
of a production line disruption due to the installation
of new less energy-consuming equipment). Still, the
project may be unstructured (without any pre-
existing solution, technological/organizational/fi-
nancial solutions must be developed, internally or
with help of external experts) and uncertain (regard-
ing its physical and financial savings).
Actors. The investment project being categorized
as non-strategic; upper management is neither
involved nor interested (Maritan 2001).61 The
project is championed, at the level of the technical
or facility management department, by a low
power manager. This manager most probably
does not master finance, strategy, or marketing;
the essential tools needed to “sell” investment
projects to upper management.
Decision-making process. As diagnosis is unfavor-
able, low resources are allocated to information
research and to the building of solutions.62 A priori
rules or routines (DeCanio 1993; Stern and Aron-
son 1984)63 impose very stringent selection criteria
regarding investment duration or discount rate,
more stringent that those which would apply to
strategic investments. Even if showing a fair—or
even high—return, the energy-efficiency invest-
ment project is rejected during the selection phase.
Sometimes no decision is made at all.
These elements are synthesized in Fig. 5 above:
It appears from our conceptual framework and em-
pirical research that strategicity is more influential than
profitability in corporate investment choices. Invest-
ment profitability appears as a generally necessary but
insufficient condition. Unfavorable diagnosis regarding
strategicity entails several negative consequences, the
most important being that upper management is not
interested and that more stringent selection criteria—or
routines—apply to non- or low strategic investments.
Energy-efficiency investments, when they do exist
as an investment category, are perceived as weakly
strategic by companies. This would explain why many
energy-efficiency projects, although highly profitable,
remain unchosen. Our findings lead us to propose an
explanation of the energy-efficiency gap different
from the mainstream one, by redesigning the market
barrier concept. This is represented by the diagram in




62 Dean and Sharfman (1993, 1996), see Footnote 17.
63 See “Introduction”.61 As shown by Maritan (2001); see section on “Strategicity.”
60 See section “A new model of investment decision making”
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As shown in the diagram, there are four levels of
organizational barriers to energy-efficiency investments,
each of them influencing the levels below. We have
labeled the four barrier levels “Base,” “Symptom,” “Re-
al,” and “Hidden.” The first two levels are the barriers
usually described in the energy-efficiency investment
literature as being responsible for the energy-efficiency
gap. We add two levels above the first ones, to better
describe the obstacles faced by energy-efficiency invest-
ments. These upper levels constitute meta-barriers, a
framework in which the other barriers can be described
(Eyre 1997), which determine energy use, routines and
decisions, or non-decisions, within firms regarding
energy-efficiency investments.
‘Base’ barrier First-level barrier concerns information,
or rather, the lack of knowledge regarding energy-
efficiency measures, as well as regarding their technical
and financial aspects. Lack of knowledge is a general
problem in firms without energy management, but it
may also be a problem in firms which domanage energy
where it arises from the complexity of energy-efficiency
measures, at least in very large buildings, which requires
multidisciplinary skills. Although this is an important
barrier, it is not sufficient to explain firms’ negative
decisions regarding energy-efficiency investments.
‘Symptom’ barriers These are designated as such be-
cause they express signs of deeper, invisible problems,
or of mistaken interpretations. For instance, capital is
not lacking but is allocated to other investments; risk is
said to be high, when in fact it is not even assessed.64
Hidden costs, which are commonly said to lower
energy-efficiency investments profitability, are an easy
explanation, especially since they cannot, by definition,
be assessed in precise figures.
‘Real’ barrier The third level is the invisible problem at
the source of second-level symptoms. It is the real
obstacle to energy-efficiency investments: Their non-
or low strategic character for companies, which consider
energy or energy use neither as a contributor to their
competitive advantage nor as a critical resource, for the
risks to the security of energy supply are ignored. Indi-
rect benefits of energy management, which can in many
cases increase strategicity, are poorly understood or
included in investment assessments.
‘Hidden’ barrier The fourth level comprises the various
cultural influences which drive organizations and their
decision makers to consider energy-efficiency invest-
ments as weakly strategic, beyond possible objective rea-
sons. It is “hidden” because it influences an organizations’
behavior and investment choices in a subconscious way.
A clear implication of our findings and of the con-
ceptual framework presented in this paper is the follow-
ing: In order to successfully champion energy-efficiency
investments, all energy-efficiency actors—scholars,
practitioners, and public programmers—need to high-
light, as much as possible, the strategic character of
energy-efficiency investments. In other words, they
need to highlight, whenever it is possible, the impact
of energy-efficiency investments on firms’ competitive
advantage in performing their core business.
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64 See the paragraphs on unorthodox behavior by companies in
our survey, regarding capital budgeting methods (toward the end
of section “General investment behavior”).
Fig. 6 Redesigning the
market barrier concept
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Appendix
Table 3 Factors influencing general investment behavior
Do you agree with the following assertions Number of answers
(Financial managers only)
Yes No Don’t know
9.3101 One can always find money to finance a good project. 11 6 0
9.3102 The profitability of an investment is not sufficient to entail
a positive decision.
15 2 0
9.3103 A project can be realized even if it is not profitable 10 7 0
9.3104 Above all, a project must contribute to the realization
of the company’s strategic goals
16 0 0
9.3105 More than an instrument supporting decisionmaking, investment
management procedure is a tool allowing to systematize the communication
between the various hierarchical levels of the company.
11 6 0
9.3106 The more uncertainty a company is facing, the less useful the capital
budgeting tools are.
6 11 0
9.3107 The more financial resources available to a company, the less useful
the formal procedures of profitability analysis
2 14 0
9.3108 The financial evaluation of an investment is a prerequisite in the
detailed analysis of investment file. 11
6 0
9.3109 financial evaluation of the investments has, after all, a small influence
on the final decision
3 13 1
9.3110 Evaluation of a strategic investment project is based on intuition
more than on figures and analysis.
6 8 3
9.3111 Investment decisions are influenced by the balance of power
between a firm’s departments.
2 14 1
9.3112 The existence of a “champion” supporting an investment project
is decisive for its adoption.
7 9 1
Table 4 Strategic character of energy-efficiency investments for energy and finance managers









1 Chain store 13 4 5 4 – – – –
2 Chain store 10 2 5 3 13 5 5 3
3 Chain store 10 4 4 2 10 4 4 2
4 Chain store 7 1 4 2 – – – –
5 Chain store 7 1 5 1 7 1 5 1
6 Furniture chain store – – – – – – – –
7 Space renting/event mgt 11 1 5 5 8 2 4 2
8 Space renting/shopping mall 8 2 5 1 – – – –
9 Parking lot 13 5 4 4 – – – –
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Table 4 (continued)









10 Bank 12 2 5 5 – – – –
11 Finance news 10 1 5 4 – – – –
12 Hotel 10 1 5 4 – – – –
13 Hotel 10 4 4 2 – – – –
14 Hotel 8 1 5 2 – – – –
15 Services b2b 10 2 5 3 – – – –
16 Services b2b 9 3 5 1 – – – –
148 35 76 47 38 12 18 8
16 16 entities, 36 sites 9.9 2.2 4.8 2.9 9.5 3 4.5 2
out of 15 out of 5 out of 5 out of 5 out of 15 out of 5 out of 5 out of 5
17 Chemical 8 1 3 4 11 4 4 3
18 Chemical 4 1 2 1 7 1 5 1
19 Chemical 13 5 5 3 11 3 4 4
20 Food production 7 2 4 1 – – – –
21 Pharmaceutical – – – – – – – –
22 Metals 13 4 5 4 10 4 4 2
23 Metals 11.5 3.5 5 3 – – – –
24 Metals 5 1 3 1 – – – –
25 Metals 8 1 5 2 8 2 4 2
26 Metals 10 4 4 2 – – – –
27 Metals 8 2 5 1 – – – –
28 Metals 10 2 5 3 – – – –
29 Metals 7 1 5 1 – – – –
30 Metals 8.5 1 4 3.5 – – – –
31 Electronics 7 1 1 5 5 1 3 1
32 Watchmaker 5 1 3 1 5 2 2 1
33 Watchmaker 9 3 3 3 – – – –
34 Watchmaker 8 1 5 2 – – – –
35 Food transformation 9 1 5 3 8 3 4 1
151 35.5 72 43.5 65 19 30 15
19 19 entities - 24 sites 8.4 2.0 4.0 2.4 8.1 2.5 3.8 1.9
out of 15 out of 5 out of 5 out of 5 out of 15 out of 5 out of 5 out of 5
70.5 148 90.5 103 31 48 23
35 35 entities, 60 sites 9.1 2.1 4.4 2.7 8.6 2.7 4.0 1.9
out of 15 out of 5 out of 5 out of 5 out of 15 out of 5 out of 5 out of 5
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